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This paper starts by contextualizing the current
trend of increasing academic fraud and corrupt
practices in quality assurance and accreditation
processes. Several factors are considered, such
as the diversiﬁcation of higher education serv-
ices and delivery systems, increased competi-
tion among students and institutions,
globalization and the cross-border education
phenomenon. The next section focuses on the
opportunities for fraud and corruption that have
been observed in two different contexts: ﬁrst,
in countries in which mechanisms for exami-
nation and accreditation are under the author-
ity of central public bodies; and second, in
countries where these mechanisms are regu-
lated and controlled by non-governmental 
bodies. Special attention is given here to inter-
national delivery services, including institu-
tions with large numbers of overseas students,
extramural education institutions and e-higher
education. The next section considers six key
strategies that can be adopted to address these
challenges, namely: regulating the market by
means of transparent criteria, reducing the risks
of conﬂict of interest, using more appropriate
management tools, developing standards and
codes of practice, facilitating public access to
information and establishing and using aware-
ness indicators, commonly referred to as red
ﬂags. After presenting the rationale behind each
strategy, the paper then provides examples of
good practices. The paper concludes with pol-
icy recommendations for the national, regional
and international levels.
INTRODUCTION
Three major trends affect the demand for higher
education today: the global growth of student
enrolment ﬁgures, the redistribution of student
enrolment among regions and the increased
traffic of students from country to country.
These trends, which will be discussed in this
paper, arguably pose major challenges for
transparency and accountability in higher edu-
cation management. 
THE MASSIFICATION OF EDUCATION
In 1970, the number of students in higher edu-
cation was 28.2 million. By 1990, it had grown
to 70.8 million and by 2004 to 132 million.
These are minimum ﬁgures, as they only
account for countries with available data. The
many reasons for this expansion in higher edu-
cation include: the increasing complexity of the
demand of modern societies and economies for
more highly trained personnel; the fact that, in
many ﬁelds, training that would have once been
provided ‘on the job’has become formalized in
institutions of higher education, including cor-
porate universities; the emergence of new ﬁelds
that rely on universities as key sources of train-
ing, such as biology and computer science; the
restructuring of higher education systems in
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
after the fall of communism, which has led to
the emergence of new public and private insti-
tutions and an increased number of students
being admitted to higher education institutions.
These trends, in generating further competition
among students – not only to be admitted to
universities, but also to enter the best institu-
tions and get the most highly valued degrees or
diplomas – have paradoxically encouraged a rat
race in higher education. 
THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT
The demand for higher education has evolved
greatly in recent years. The following are the
dominant countries in terms of size and growth
of enrolment ﬁgures: China, which had 19.4
million students in 2004; the United States,
which had about 17 million students in 2004;
India, which had 11.3 million students in 2004;
Russia, which had 8.6 million students in 2004;
Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, which had between 3
and 4 million students each in 2004; and,
ﬁnally, Argentina, Egypt, France, Italy, South
Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Thai-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Ukraine,
which had between 2 and 3 million students
each in 2004. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the regional uniﬁcation of Europe,
new models are gaining popular support, such
as combining courses at different universities
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and campuses in different countries, which at times blurs
the overall picture. 
Finally, while nations control what happens within
their borders via various regulations and requirements,
the vast enrolment ﬁgures for transnational education,
which had about 2.5 million students in 2004, has natu-
rally led to an increasing demand for quality assurance,
mutual accreditation of institutions and awards, and
mutual recognition of qualiﬁcations. 
THE CROSS-BORDER PHENOMENON OF OVERSEAS
STUDENTS AND COURSES
Economic globalization has contributed to the interna-
tional mobility of labour and students (see Box I.7.1 for
some ﬁgures that illustrate this phenomenon). This has
generated a huge market in the international trade in
higher education, which now moves billions of dollars
and is a major source of income for a few provider coun-
tries. However, the cross-border phenomenon is also
characterized by the development of overseas courses
with at times extremely complex and even opaque admin-
istration. Pebble Hills University offers a striking exam-
ple of this: not only does it claim to offer degrees in a
variety of ﬁelds, it also claims to be incorporated in Hutt
River Province Principality in Western Australia and to
have a license to grant degrees from the Principality of
Seborga in Italy. Moreover, the degrees offered are taught
in learning centres in what are referred to as knowledge
villages in Dubai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,
Lebanon and Nigeria (Brown, 2005). 
The explosion of new information and communication
technologies has rendered the current situation even more
complex, with the multiplication of both virtual institu-
tions and distance education programmes. The ﬁnancing
and quality assurance mechanisms of these educational
providers are rather different from those of conventional
higher education establishments.
These major trends are certainly promising, as they
reveal that more students have access to universities, new
regions are emerging and new opportunities for studying
abroad are rapidly developing. At the same time, they
contribute to increasing competition among students and
institutions, to changes in roles and functions of univer-
sities, to the emergence of new providers, and so on. All
of these factors could generate new incentives for aca-
demic fraud and corrupt behaviour.
THE INCREASED COMPETITION AMONG STUDENTS AND
INSTITUTIONS
The increased competition among students (for admis-
sion to the best or second-best institutions and prog-
rammes) and between institutions (traditional,
transnational, distance, single, networks of institutions
and programmes, and so on) is today a worldwide phe-
nomenon. Unless well regulated and controlled, this
pressure increases the risk of academic fraud and cheat-
ing by students (for example to gain entrance to educa-
tional institutions or pass exams) and by higher
education institutions (relaxing academic admission con-
ditions, selling fake programmes or delivering fake cer-
tificates, and so on). In Georgia, for example, some
private tutors take bribes to help guarantee that students
are admitted to the department of their choice. These pri-
vate tutors are generally on examination committees and
therefore have connections within universities, are famil-
iar with the content of exam papers, and can manipulate
admission procedures to improve the chances of an
applicant gaining entry to a particular university
(Janashia, 2004). Competition in the area of research is
also having detrimental effects. For example, higher edu-
cation institutions, as producers of research, are now
even more susceptible to plagiarism. As they are also
consumers of research (given that undergraduate
degrees, master’s degrees, PhDs and additional funding,
particularly from private companies such as pharmaceu-
tical industries, are all obtained through the submission
of research work), they are also more vulnerable to the
manipulation of research results.
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According to UNESCO, there were over a mil-
lion students studying abroad in 1995. Some
data suggests that by 2002 the number of for-
eign students had grown to about 2.04 million
in industrialized countries and to 1.80 million
in the least-developed countries (LDCs), with
the leading providers being Australia, France,
Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom
and the United States (UNESCO Yearbook).
According to the OECD, international student
mobility to OECD countries has doubled in the
past 20 years. Most international trade in
higher education services takes place within
the OECD area, which has received 85 per cent
of foreign students over this period. Foreign
students are now an important source of
export revenue in several countries, as they
spend large amounts of money on travel, edu-
cation and living expenses. Export revenue in
education services, for example, amounted to
an estimated minimum of US$30 billion in
1999. Moreover, according to estimates, US
exports generated about US$8 billion (a rather
conservative estimate) in the late 1990s. The
fifth-largest export service sector was higher
education, which provided 4 million jobs. An
estimate by the Global Alliance for Transna-
tional Education indicates that the United
States, the United Kingdom and Australia
together exported about US$27 billion worth
of higher education to Asia and the Pacific
over the same period.
Box I.7.1 The cross-border phenomenon: some figures
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THE MORE DOMINANT GATE-KEEPING FUNCTION OF
UNIVERSITIES
A university degree is gradually becoming a prerequisite
for an increasing number of occupations. Certiﬁcation is
now indispensable for most positions of power, authority
and prestige in modern societies. This puts immense
responsibility in the hands of higher education institutions
and, at the same time, opens enormous opportunities for
corrupt practices. Testing for admission to higher educa-
tion has become a key role of higher education institu-
tions, which they share with the ministry of education in
some cases. Tests are the main tools used in the admis-
sions process and are the major determinants of future
success in education, employment, income and social sta-
tus. Because of competition between institutions and for
access to speciﬁc professions, the pressure of the demand
for access to the ‘right institution’ and the ‘right courses’
generates and sustains corrupt behaviours. Furthermore,
universities are playing a greater role as examining bod-
ies. This is due to various reasons, in particular the expan-
sion in education and the consequent need to provide ever
more competitive sorting mechanisms to control access
to high-prestige occupations. Universities are seen de
facto as meritocratic institutions that can be trusted to pro-
vide fair and impartial testing. However, when their test-
ing mechanisms break down (for example in China) or
are subject to corrupt practices (for example in India),
their image is signiﬁcantly weakened. 
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW HIGHER EDUCATION PROVIDERS 
The emergence of new providers of higher education has
contributed to the diversiﬁcation of the higher education
market, with the creation of technical institutes, commu-
nity colleges, liberal arts colleges, mega-universities, on
and off campuses, and so on. Many countries have there-
fore experienced a boost in private secondary education
initiatives (for example in the Philippines, the majority of
students attend private colleges and universities); an exo-
dus of students abroad (a rough estimate suggests that
more than 150,000 Indian students are enrolled in educa-
tion abroad); a diversiﬁcation of production and delivery
technologies; and the development of a signiﬁcant mar-
ket for the providers of e-training and other distance and
open institutions (as early as 1992, the Open University
in the United Kingdom had more than 120,000 students).
For the higher education market to operate effectively and
fairly within this context, there is a strong need for certi-
ﬁed information about what is being offered by each insti-
tution and the actual value in terms of learning
achievements, skill development and qualiﬁcation. How-
ever, there is a twofold obstacle to achieving this: not all
stakeholders agree to respect the need for accreditation,
and even accredited entities and programmes do not
always provide services of similar quality.
THE DIVERSIFICATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION MARKETS
Advances in information and communication technolo-
gies have assisted in the development of new ways of
delivering higher education and demonstrated the possi-
bility of enhancing the quality and quantity of learning.
For well-established and large-scale distance teaching
universities, the shift to using new technologies necessi-
tates a major overhaul of activities and huge investments
in entirely new infrastructure for the development and
delivery of new courses. The major decisions required to
initiate these changes cannot be taken easily or quickly.
However, it is evident that if distance education universi-
ties do not positively face the challenges of merging and
continuously evolving technologies, they may lose stu-
dents and government support. International joint ven-
tures, ﬁnanced by global networks, could help speed up
the adoption of new e-learning technologies on an even
wider scale. The question, however, is: in this scenario,
who will be regarded as accountable, to whom and how?
Due to the mushrooming of new degree programmes and
private institutions, sometimes with a high likelihood of
the delivery of fake services and certiﬁcation, there is also
a growing need for the recognition of certiﬁcates, diplo-
mas, courses, training programmes and institutions. This
need is being translated into more demand for quality
assurance and accreditation from institutions and deliv-
ery mechanisms.
THE DEMAND FOR PROFESSIONAL GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION
Despite imponderables, it is likely that demand for access
to education by an ever-widening segment of the popula-
tion will continue overall. However, limited funds and the
desire for efficient allocation of resources will come into
direct conﬂict with demands for access, which will put
greater pressure on higher education. As institutions
become larger and more complex, there will also be
increasing pressure for a greater level of professional
administration. At the same time, traditional forms of
governance will come under increasing pressure to
reform, as they will become inefficient in institutions that
are growing larger and more bureaucratic. Moreover, the
overall administration of higher education will be profes-
sionalized. The demands for accountability will also
increase, causing institutions considerable difficulty. And
as academic budgets increase, there will be an inevitable
demand to monitor and control expenditures and a call
for more transparency and accountability in resource
management. 
ACADEMIC FRAUD, ACCREDITATION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 111
0230000479_09_cha07  11/10/06  13:58  Page 111
ACADEMIC FRAUD AND QUALITY ASSURANCE:
KEY ISSUES
Corruption occurs at all levels in universities. The Geor-
gian case study exempliﬁes this. There, widespread mis-
conduct affects university examinations, the conferring of
academic credentials, the procurement of goods and serv-
ices, and the licensing and accreditation of institutions. It
is also now accepted that academic fraud and corrupt prac-
tices involve a variety of stakeholders, including examina-
tion candidates, teachers, faculty members, supervisors,
officials and employees of examination authorities, in
addition to managers of courses, programmes, institutions,
universities, and so on. Entities in charge of quality assur-
ance and accreditation are also susceptible to corrupt prac-
tices, which is even more worrisome. Within this context,
and given the complexity and diversity of the trends
described above, it is extremely difficult to produce a com-
prehensive list of all opportunities for academic fraud.
This would be a useful exercise, however, as it would help
to analyse the causes of corruption in higher education and
to design strategies to address it. This paper thus focuses
on a broad cluster of opportunities for corrupt practice. In
doing so, it maintains a distinction between the existing
forms of higher education and the new forms emerging
both within and outside of traditional public and private
higher education sectors, despite there being blurred
boundaries between the two.
ACADEMIC FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN TRADITIONAL
FORMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Academic fraud and corruption in traditional forms of
higher education take various forms, namely agreements
between students and faculty members or administrators,
such as students paying professors for good grades or
administrators charging students’ families for admission
to their university. However, examinations are the key
area for a variety of malpractices. These can take place
before, during or after exams. Some examples of these
malpractices follow.
BEFORE THE EXAMINATION
 University professors offering university applicants
expensive tutorial sessions that serve as a condition
for entry or success.
 Officials, paper-setters, moderators or school admin-
istrators leaking the content of exam papers prior to
the exam because of nepotism, favouritism or bribery.
 Preparing the actual topics of an examination before-
hand (for example in Pakistan, some paper-setters
were found to be operating their own tuition centres
for exam candidates, who, upon payment of substan-
tial fees, were granted access to at least part of their
exam papers).
DURING THE EXAMINATION 
 Impersonation (that is, unregistered candidates tak-
ing the examinations of registered candidates, some-
times with the full knowledge of the supervisor).
 Candidates smuggling in cheating material (for exam-
ple written notes or textbooks hidden in garments).
 External assistance (from helpers, for example, with
the use of cell phones).
 Plagiarism in answering examination questions or in
writing term papers.
 Copying and collusion among candidates.
 Irregularities during the examination process (for
example the amount of time allotted to a candidate
being altered for no justiﬁable reason).
 Intimidation of supervisory staff (for example by
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Academic fraud
 Academic fraud is defined as the use of
public office for private gain in the academic
field, especially regarding accreditation of
courses and institutions, examinations for
access and for transfers between institu-
tions, certificates and diplomas, university/
college research and publications.
 It represents any prescribed action taken in
connection with an examination or test or
with accreditation that attempts to gain
unfair advantage or, in some cases, to place
a candidate – student or institutions – at a
disadvantage.
 It also refers to the extent to which proce-
dures to standardize the conditions under
which examinations are prepared, adminis-
tered and scored are observed or violated. 
Academic fraud is evidently just one example
of corrupt practice in higher education. It
always has consequences for higher education
in terms of corruption. For example, academic
plagiarism is a form of academic fraud, but it
also represents non-compliance with copyright
law. However, not all corrupt practices result-
ing from corrupt academic management can
be regarded as academic fraud. 
Autonomy and accountability
Autonomy is inconceivable without accounta-
bility – and not only in managerial and admin-
istrative terms. There is a duty to provide serv-
ices within the framework of a balance
between autonomy and accountability and an
agreement between universities and the world
of work. The concept of autonomy is often
used to support the claim that any form of
accountability negates the principle that uni-
versities must manage their own affairs with-
out external interference. In pluralistic
societies, most controls take the form of
accreditation and institutional authorizations,
as well as general official recognition, particu-
larly of academic degrees and diplomas. 
Box I.7.2 A reminder of a few definitions
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candidates, external helpers, parents, politicians, and
so on).
 Improper assignment of candidates by officials to tar-
geted centres.
 The use of ghost centres (that is, ﬁctitious exam cen-
tres established by corrupt examination officials,
where candidates can complete exams with the sup-
port of helpers and/or without supervision).
 The purchase of ﬁnished term papers, particularly on
the Internet (for example via so-called ‘paper mills’).
 Substitution of scripts (that is, scripts written during
an examination being replaced with scripts written
either before or after the examination).
AFTER THE EXAMINATION (ADMISSION TO UNIVERSITIES)
 Grading malpractices (that is, collusion between the
candidate and the grader, intimidation of graders by
parents, or intimidation of parents by graders seeking
rewards from candidates’ parents).
 Bribery of the academic authorities responsible for
admissions and/or for officially awarding scholar-
ships to candidates on the basis of academic qualiﬁ-
cations or exam results.
 Falsiﬁcation of data ﬁles and result sheets, often by
corrupt officials (for example admission test scores
or the ranking of students in the admission list being
illegally changed).
 Illegally changing fee-paying and non-fee-paying
quotas.
 Sale of seats to students whose test scores do not qual-
ify them for a position (at times through a bidding
process, if the number of seats is limited).
 Issuing fake credentials and diplomas (for example
via diploma mills).
 Manipulation of curricula vitae in order to obtain a
job or pay increase (for example using fake diplomas,
non-existent publications, and so on).
 Selling academic posts (for gifts, bribes, free work or
other emoluments) or granting them based on ethnic
or religious backgrounds.
Many malpractices are also found in the area of
research, academic journals and publications, such as pla-
giarism, fabrication or falsiﬁcation of data, distortions or
manipulations of research results, manipulation of statis-
tics, biases and conﬂicts of interest among reviewers, and
so on. Some university lecturers and researchers, for
example, give consultations to private ﬁrms without any
form of control by their university hierarchy. At times,
this practice has a strong impact on the rate of attendance,
inﬂuences teaching content and introduces bias in
research conclusions.
CORRUPTION IN NEW FORMS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
In recent years, extensive developments in ICTs have
immensely widened the scope for fraud in academia and,
at the same time, introduced innovative new methods of
malpractice. The Internet (and all forms of e-learning) is
now arguably the leading vehicle for fraudulent practices.
Among other things, it has facilitated the practices of sell-
ing essays and term papers (rendering plagiarism a major
problem), as well as fake degrees, at times even from rep-
utable colleges and institutions such as Harvard and Yale
or others in London and Paris. According to the Swedish
National Agency for Higher Education, Sweden is now
affected by academic fraud to a greater extent than ever
before. The country’s problems include: bogus PhDs 
supposedly from Swedish higher education institutions,
students applying for courses based on fake qualiﬁcations
and individuals applying for posts using fake degrees. In
addition, there are many fake universities, some of which
advertise in the international press, circulate information
by sending spam and rank high on the hit lists of search
engines. These universities also sell qualiﬁcations from
Swedish higher education institutions, claiming that they
are members of the institutions (see the website of
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) at:
http://www.sida.se). 
Indeed, websites specializing in fraudulent services
are numerous today. Two examples are www.fakede-
grees.com and www.cheathouse.com. Box I.7.3 provides
another striking example of the impact that progress in
new communication technologies has had on fraud in
higher education.
The transnational education boom has also contributed
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Degree mills have been around for hundreds
of years, and they are still flourishing all over
the world. During the 1980s, the number of
phony schools significantly diminished
because of the FBI’s DipScam diploma-mill task
force. The work of this body helped to secure
indictments and, in most cases, brought about
the convictions of many individuals. This trend
has unfortunately been reversed and the prob-
lem is now actually getting worse. Both in the
United States and in Europe, diploma mills
have made a real comeback due to the decline
of DipScam, which began in the early 1990s,
as well as the advent of inexpensive laser print-
ers, colour copiers, overnight delivery services,
800, 888 and 500 telephone numbers, faxes,
computer bulletin boards and other accessible
technology, especially the Internet.
Source: Bear and Bear, 2004.
Box I.7.3 Degree mills
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to the emergence of new opportunities for fraud. The fol-
lowing are some illustrations of this involving the man-
agement of overseas students and the franchising of
overseas courses.
MANAGEMENT OF OVERSEAS STUDENTS
 Overseas students being offered ﬁnancial incentives
to enrol.
 Applicants being given false hope or promised admis-
sion on the spot.
 Applicants not eligible for admissions unduly charged
a variety of fees.
 Applicants using fake credentials to gain admission.
 Applicants being charged by education agents for the
falsiﬁcation of documents that will qualify them for
university entry.
 Indiscriminate recruitment of foreign students as a
means of chasing money (that is, the acceptance of
fake diplomas, lack of language skills, and so on).
 Bogus institutions that do not deliver the services they
advertise. These are often unsustainable institutions
that close down after the receipt of money.
 Bogus institutions promising visas to overseas stu-
dents who enrol in their courses.
 Institutions and courses without proper accreditation
being included on the official lists prepared for inter-
national students.
 Lowering of academic standards for overseas stu-
dents (that is, with regard to admission, performance,
graduation, and so on).
 Overseas students being allowed to repeat courses sev-
eral times, even when they have no prospect of passing.
FRANCHISING OF OVERSEAS COURSES
 Corrupt officers making money by issuing licences
and franchise rights and collecting fees/bribes from
those wanting franchises.
 Students enrolling at franchised institutions assum-
ing that since they are paying fees they will automat-
ically qualify.
 Reducing the number of failing students by inﬂating
the grades of those at risk of failing and turning a
blind eye to plagiarism. 
 Students, parents, the franchisee or the franchising
institution pressuring faculty members to adjust grad-
ing standards so that everyone passes examinations
and assessments (for example, in institutions in
China, Malaysia and Vietnam).
CORRUPTION IN QUALITY ASSURANCE AND
ACCREDITATION MECHANISMS
Accreditation and certiﬁcation processes worldwide are
increasingly being undermined by fraud. According to
Bear and Bear (2004): 
There are more than 300 unaccredited universities now
operating. While a few are genuine start-ups or online
ventures, the great majority range from simply being
of dreadful quality to being outright diploma mills,
which are fake institutions that sell degrees for
between US$3,000 and US$5,000. It is not uncommon
for a large bogus school to ‘award’ as many as 500
PhD’s each year and, as a consequence, earn an
aggregate income easily in excess of US$200 million.
Data shows that a single phony school can earn
between US$10 million and US$20 million annually. 
More speciﬁc forms of malpractice in quality assurance
and accreditation include: 
 Payment of bribes to obtain successful certiﬁcation
or accreditation.
 Distortion in the application of accreditation criteria,
for example admitting below-standard candidates to
meet enrolment criteria (ex ante) or over-grading stu-
dents to meet achievement criteria (ex post).
 Accreditation processes based on non-transparent cri-
teria (because rectors have an interest in preventing
competition).
 Higher education providers circumventing accredita-
tion procedures through franchising schemes or intro-
ducing courses in segments of the education system
where accreditation is not compulsory.
 Establishing schools for the sole purpose of making a
proﬁt by lying about their accreditation status, thus
preventing their students from taking national licens-
ing exams.
 Non-accredited institutions falsely issuing accredited
degrees.
 Creation of fraudulent or bogus accreditation agen-
cies (accreditation mills, which are at times estab-
lished by higher education institutions themselves).
DIFFERENCES BASED ON CONTEXT
Because opportunities for corruption may depend on the
model in place, certain distinctions may arise based on the
context. Indeed, a brief glance at higher education
throughout the world reveals a continuum of academic
systems: from highly centralized models (for example
France and China) to almost completely decentralized
ones (for example Australia, Canada and India); from fed-
eral systems (for example Germany and the United States)
to systems where the private sector is in competition with
the public sector (for example Latin America and Japan);
from systems which, until quite recently, were fragmented,
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with numerous and over-specialized establishments (as in
the former communist European countries), to systems
that are virtually carbon copies of others (as in some coun-
tries in Africa and the Arab region). Similarly, systems of
quality assurance and accreditation vary from country to
country. A distinction should therefore be made between
the following two models: quality assurance and accredi-
tation regulated and controlled by central public bodies
(for example ministries of education, University Grants
Commissions, and so on) and quality assurance and
accreditation regulated and controlled by non-governmen-
tal bodies (for example independent commissions, private
entities, professional associations, and so on).
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ACCREDITATION REGULATED AND
CONTROLLED BY CENTRAL PUBLIC BODIES 
This is the prevailing model in many societies, typically
those with a strong tradition of centralized education
administration, as in France and some former Soviet coun-
tries. In this case, quality assurance mechanisms are often
conﬁned to the educational activities of institutions within
national boundaries and are not always consistent nation-
wide. Moreover, the monopoly power exerted by public
bodies and the regular occurrence of collusion of interests
open doors for a variety of corrupt practices, such as the
payment of bribes for university admission or to success-
fully obtain accreditation, accreditation processes based
on non-transparent criteria, distortion in the application of
accreditation criteria, and so on. A study undertaken in
Ukraine, where there are some 175 accredited private
higher education institutions, shows that the main areas of
corruption in the education sector include large state uni-
versities that control licensing and accreditation. Inter-
views conducted with 43 rectors, vice rectors and
administrators from ﬁve private universities revealed that
successful licensing or accreditation applications, with
few exceptions, required some form of bribery; that licens-
ing, mandatory only for private institutions, may require
a bribe of US$200 (about two months’salary for a typical
academic); and that accreditation might call for a ‘gratu-
ity’ of 10 or 20 times that amount (Stetar et al., 2005).
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ACCREDITATION REGULATED AND
CONTROLLED BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL BODIES 
With the higher education market now becoming liberal-
ized, this is the model currently in vogue. In principle,
this model offers low risks of collusion and conﬂict of
interest between the bodies in charge of accreditation and
the beneﬁciaries of its service. But de-linking the bodies
in charge of quality assurance and accreditation from
higher education institutions does not address the other
manifold causes of corruption and academic fraud, such
as: illegitimate regulatory bodies; the partial or inconsis-
tent scope of quality assurance and accreditation, leaving
room for managers to misuse procedures; non-compli-
ance of higher education institutions with quality assur-
ance procedures, and so on. Experience shows that this
regulation model can also be distorted. For example,
higher education providers can circumvent accreditation
procedures through franchising schemes, schools can lie
about their accreditation status, bogus accredited agen-
cies can be created (particularly via the web), and so on.
ACADEMIC FRAUD AND QUALITY ASSURANCE:
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Given the enormous complexity of the problems, the vari-
ety of opportunities for academic fraud, and the impor-
tance of contextual and societal factors, universally
applicable solutions cannot be provided to address these
challenges. Each country, and institution, must be prop-
erly diagnosed and the appropriate strategies to meet the
challenges must be identiﬁed. However, from the experi-
ence gained worldwide in this area, three guiding princi-
ples could be proposed for designing strategies.
PRINCIPLE 1: QUALITY ASSURANCE POLICIES SHOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO A VIRTUOUS CYCLE (AND NOT A
VICIOUS ONE)
In most cases, quality assurance supports accreditation
and accredited institutions are fraud-free. By addressing
the issues based on the type of provider, what needs to be
provided, the mode, media and location of the delivery
system, and the curricula and teaching content, internal
and external quality assurance arrangements provide the
key elements for accreditation and reduce or eliminate
opportunities for academic fraud. Put differently, accred-
ited institutions assume that quality assurance is
addressed and contribute to combating academic fraud.
This is the virtuous cycle. Under this circumstance, qual-
ity assurance and accreditation are central approaches for
combating fraud for both new and existing forms of
higher education. When in some societies, for political
reasons or because of lack of resources, it is impossible to
adopt quality assurance and impose accreditation proce-
dures on institutions, there are still some pragmatic means
of addressing corruption, as illustrated in the section
below, Addressing the challenges.
However, a vicious cycle can occur when the chal-
lenges of quality assurance are not properly addressed
and the quality assurance process offers opportunities for
corruption. This is the case when the accountability of
the accrediting institution or mechanism is not well
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established; when the accrediting institution or mecha-
nism is not free of collusion of interests or when it is a
tool of social, political or ﬁnancial pressure on the deliv-
ery system requesting accreditation. Worst of all, this
occurs when the team in charge of quality assurance
manipulates data and the accrediting mechanism is based
on dishonest grounds. An unaccredited institution, how-
ever, is not necessarily a diploma mill. Some truck-driv-
ing schools, massage therapy colleges and even
computer schools, for example, choose not to be accred-
ited and yet still hold classes, teach students and hold
them accountable for learning. 
PRINCIPLE 2: SOUND POLICIES SHOULD CONSIDER THE
WIDE DISSEMINATION OF THE SOCIAL, FINANCIAL AND
ETHICAL COSTS OF FRAUD
The costs of fraud are generally either ignored or over-
looked by higher education stakeholders. However, in
order to mobilize authorities and the public at large against
fraud, there is a need to raise their awareness about the
enormous social, ﬁnancial and ethical implications it can
have. Consequences of fraud include greater inequity and
unfairness in selection procedures, scepticism about the
performance of higher educational systems, costs involved
in introducing reliable security measures, and so on. The
different categories of stakeholders affected by different
types of fraud include the following: 
 The honest clients who are the victims of fraud. They
are charged fees and other costs and receive in
exchange fake services and certiﬁcates or the person
they think is a trained teacher, business consultant, or
engineer may not have the degree or even the know-
ledge required.
 The employers who are victims of unqualiﬁed
employees using fake credentials, which causes them
ﬁnancial liability and may also cause injury to people
or property. In a recent survey of human resource
managers in 1,500 major UK companies, over half
said that lying on CVs was a serious problem for their
organization and over 70 per cent said that they had
encountered cases of serious lying on CVs from
prospective job applicants (‘t’ Magazine 2000).
 The citizens who as taxpayers subsidize higher edu-
cation, and therefore may gradually question the rai-
son d’être of the tax system and the legitimacy of
ﬁnancing higher education. Fake institutions can
indeed take millions from good institutions and foul
the waters of non-traditional higher education.
Within this context, the ethical cost of fraud should be
taken very seriously, as its consequences are potentially
devastating. Two illustrations of this are: a prominent 
paediatrician was discovered to have forged his medical
degree from the University of California; and for more
than 20 years an expert witness provided scientiﬁc testi-
mony in more than 300 cases before the California Supe-
rior Court without having the adequate credentials.
PRINCIPLE 3: POLICIES SHOULD BE COMPREHENSIVE
AND TARGET NOT ONLY ACADEMIC FRAUD BUT ALSO
OTHER CORRUPT PRACTICES 
Higher education, like any other sector, is subject to cor-
rupt practices, as it involves the management of different
kinds of resources. Corrupt practices are known to affect
all kinds of expenditures, including construction, pur-
chase of equipment and materials, payment of salaries,
and so on. It can take the form of misuse of physical and
human resources and accompany the outsourcing of
activities (for example support services to students and
academics). Like at other levels of education, corrupt
practices can develop when ﬁnancing mechanisms (that
is, per capita grants) offer opportunities for misbehaviour.
A recent illustration of the possible manipulation of sta-
tistics is offered by El Alto, the public university of
Bolivia, which failed to certify its enrolment ﬁgures. As
a consequence, it could not receive its ﬁnancial allocation
from the Bolivian gas royalty until quite recently (El
Diario, February 16, 2006).
Beyond these similarities, in order to assess the vari-
ous costs of corruption in higher education, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that higher education is distinctive
as a socioeconomic activity in the following two respects:
 First, it is intensive in ‘speciﬁc capital investment,
both human and physical’, meaning that its capital
must be designed and deﬁned speciﬁcally for the con-
struction of buildings, the installation of training
equipment and the recruitment of staff and lecturers,
and so on. Because physical and human capital is to
a large extent different in each case, it is difficult to
standardize and therefore benchmark investment
costs. Unlike manufactured goods, for instance, the
supplier has much more information about the true
costs than the purchaser does (the ‘information asym-
metry’), which translates into greater opportunities
for corruption, even when competitive bidding is in
place and adhered to. This is all the more true with
cross-border providers, when education is delivered
via open or distance methods (especially in the case
of e-teaching), and when a programme or course
offered is a small or marginal part of the services
offered by a mega-university or corporate institution
that can easily transfer investment costs between var-
ious services.
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 Second, higher education is a network activity. It is
not fundamentally a heap of structures but rather a
ﬂow of services, that is, training, research, certiﬁca-
tion, support services to the community, contractual
arrangements with industry and services, partnership
and other linkages with sponsors, and so on. Being a
network activity, higher education runs two major
risks: one, the range of services offered often includes
areas with monopoly power, which are in the hands of
either the training institution or one of its counter-
parts; and two, the services are not always offered by
a single stakeholder or controlled in a transparent
way, thus offering easy opportunities for corrupt prac-
tices supported by potential collusion of interests
(sponsors may interfere in the choice of a service
delivery method, a provider, equipment, and so on).
This is why government authorities usually regulate the
operation of institutions of higher education and require
that external audits be conducted on a regular basis. At the
same time, when regulators (accrediting bodies) include
areas with monopoly power, and even more so, when col-
lusion of interests occurs in regulating bodies and higher
education institutions, corruption can become rampant or
even pandemic. Regulators themselves may need to be
regulated. On a different yet relevant note, in many coun-
tries, including the European region, access to jobs in
higher education (particularly teaching positions) is not
regulated by an entirely free and well-informed job mar-
ket, which leads to opportunities for corrupt practices. All
of these issues need to be properly taken into consideration
when addressing corruption problems.
ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES: SIX LINES 
OF ACTION
Six main lines of action are presented below to address
the various challenges mentioned above. Examples of
good practices are mentioned whenever possible, so as to
illustrate the strategy.
LINE 1: REGULATING THE MARKET WITH TRANSPARENT
CRITERIA
Whether the system is centralized or decentralized, with
predominant control by the state or non-governmental
procedures, it is necessary to regulate the operating con-
ditions of the higher education market so as to combat
fraud. This means that clear admission criteria and pro-
cedures must be set. This concern has led certain former
Soviet countries to establish reliable, transparent
mechanisms for administering exams for graduation
from higher education. Ukraine, for instance, has created
standardized national exams and Kyrgyzstan has set up
a uniﬁed testing system (see Box I.7.4). It also means that
clear assessment guidelines and transparent standards
and processes for quality assurance and accrediting bod-
ies must be developed. UNESCO and OECD have paved
the way by formulating guidelines for quality in cross-
border higher education (see the section in this volume
devoted to this issue). 
Of course, the issue is not only setting up transparent
criteria and procedures, but also ensuring that they have
been actually enforced. There have been many successful
systems for checking qualiﬁcations and credentials (see
Box I.7.5). All of these systems are gradually turning to
e-mechanisms, either independently at the national level
(for example in South Africa, China and the United
States) or by soliciting the help of specialized organiz-
ations such as QualSearch in Australia or Experian in the
United Kingdom. China also claims to have developed a
central veriﬁcation system through which the legitimacy
of qualiﬁcations can be veriﬁed (www.chsi.com.cn), but
there is no evidence that it is fully operational. 
LINE 2: REDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
An efficient means of reducing the risk of conflicts of
interest among agents in charge of certification and
accreditation is to establish autonomous professional
bodies with fair representation of stakeholders (public
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In Kyrgyzstan, since 2002, admission to uni-
versities is based on the National Scholarship
Test (NST), which is run by an independent
testing organization. Potential university stu-
dents now have to take standardized multi-
ple-choice aptitude tests, which are
administered with strict security measures
(such as paper scanning and computerized
grading). The NST is supported throughout
the country, essentially because it has resulted
in the fair distribution of scholarships. Its per-
vasive effect on equity and transparency, how-
ever, is an issue that still needs to be
addressed. Another issue is sustainability:
high-stakes testing is a volatile political
endeavour in any country. Despite success to
date, weak governance and widespread cor-
ruption fosters conditions that will continue
to make the sustainability of independent
testing challenging for its proponents. 
Source: Drummond and DeYoung, 2003.
Box I.7.4 The National Scholarship Test in Kyrgyzstan
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and private). A promising development in this regard is
the outsourcing and subcontracting of exam manage-
ment in order to limit interferences and thus lower the
probability of academic fraud. Another is the establish-
ment of independent organizations, such as the Aus-
tralian Universities Quality Agency (see Box I.7.6 for
more details). Private consulting firms that offer their
services online to provide judgments on accredited and
non-accredited institutions can also be very useful. Such
institutions must comply with codes of conduct that pro-
tect against distorted behaviour such as conflicts of
interest. Another important approach is to de-link 
bodies in charge of certification and accreditation. For
example, in the medical field, Heyneman (2004) sug-
gests that the process by which individuals apply to
practise or become certified in their professions should
be separate from the realm of higher education instit-
utions: ‘No matter how excellent, no university should
provide a license to practice medicine. This license
should be awarded by a board of medical examiners that
also manages a system of testing that all medical 
students must pass. Similar systems must be established
for law, accounting and others. The key to this new 
system is to allow many higher education institutions to
compete with one another.’
However, in some societies, institutional control tends
to take the form of political repression. As a result, univer-
sities in these countries put up enormous resistance to
quality assurance and accreditation by outside bodies.
The real dilemma is that countries with a lack of social
control may fuel corruption by demanding accreditation
and pressing for more accountability and that countries
with more established democratic traditions may limit the
autonomy and thus distort the behaviour of academic
institutions so as to serve the public opinion agenda. 
To be effective, an accountability system should (i)
clearly state the rules and procedures associated with
managing the education system; (ii) provide a mechanism
for monitoring compliance; (iii) specify the consequences
of non-compliance; and (iv) be consistently enforced.
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In South Africa, a global background ver-
ification company known as Kroll MIE
(www.mie.co.za) runs a fully automated, cen-
tralized online degree verification system. The
system links each university and technikon to
a centralized database where third-party
queries may be filed.
Several countries with the same education
system as the United Kingdom have come
together to create a new centralized service for
checking higher education qualifications. The
service is based on data provided by Higher
Education Futures Ltd, a subsidiary of the
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) and
the first body of its type in the world. The serv-
ice will provide employers with a single refer-
ence where they can verify an individual’s
degree qualifications. The new service will be
provided by Experian and will form part of
Candidate Verifier, a comprehensive service
that checks a range of credentials on CVs 
(‘t’ Magazine).
Higher education providers in the United
States have traditionally outsourced the 
verification of qualifications. Due to the vol-
ume of verifications required, companies such
as the National Student Clearinghouse
(www.degreeverify.com) and Credentials
(www.degreechk.com) have taken up the
challenge.
Australia has welcomed the introduction of
QualSearch (www.qualsearch.com.au), an
online authentication system designed to
assess claims of qualifications conferred by
Australian universities. The system draws on
an existing platform that facilitates third-party
queries performed via an online portal.
Box I.7.5 Qualification fraud in South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia
AUQA was established under the Australian
Corporations Law as a not-for-profit company
limited by guarantee. It has a board of twelve
directors, four of whom are elected by the
CEOs of self-accrediting institutions, and one
by the CEOs of non-self-accrediting institu-
tions. Its members are the nine ministers
responsible for higher education at the state,
territory and Commonwealth levels.
AUQA’s objectives are to:
1. Arrange and manage a system of periodic
audits of quality assurance arrangements
relating to the activities of Australian uni-
versities, other self-accrediting institutions
(SAIs) and state and territory higher educa-
tion (HE) accreditation bodies.
2. Monitor, review, analyse and provide pub-
lic reports on quality assurance arrange-
ments in SAIs, on the processes and
procedures of state and territory accredita-
tion authorities, and on the impact of those
processes on the quality of programmes.
3. Report on the criteria for the accreditation
of new universities and non-university
higher education courses, using information
obtained during the audit of institutions and
state and territory accreditation processes.
4. Report on the relative standards of the Aus-
tralian higher education system and its
quality assurance processes, including their
international standing, using information
obtained during the auditing processes. 
AUQA has not yet completed its first cycle of
reviews of all Australian universities and other
higher education providers. The reports are
available on their website: www.auqa.edu.au.
Box I.7.6 Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA)
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LINE 3: DEVELOPING STANDARDS AND CODES OF
PRACTICE OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY
Another important component of a strategy to ﬁght aca-
demic fraud is the design and adoption of professional,
ethical and honour codes of conduct for both students and
teachers. A number of countries such as Canada, Hong
Kong, India and the United States have had particularly
relevant experiences in this regard. Comparative studies
carried out by the International Institute for Educational
Planning (IIEP) in this area (Nuland et al., 2006) conclude
that a number of conditions are required for such codes
to be effective and complied with, namely: participatory
procedures for their design and maintenance; a proper
information system on their content and the ‘rules of the
game’, including the penalties for non-compliance; and
the training of key stakeholders, including members of
the education and administrative professions. The main
concern is not to identify and prosecute individuals but
to change the ethos and quality assurance culture by
accrediting entities and academic institutions. In a con-
text of internationalization and even more so of the glob-
alization of higher education, special guidelines and
codes of practice are required for the recruitment and sup-
port of overseas students (see Box I.7.7). 
LINE 4: USING MORE EFFECTIVE AND TRANSPARENT
MANAGEMENT TOOLS
More effective and transparent management tools are
needed for both traditional and new forms of higher edu-
cation, and for the mechanisms and bodies in charge of
quality assurance and accreditations. The more system-
atic use of ICTs, for instance, offers the potential to detect
fraud, check for plagiarism and increase the costs of cor-
rupt practices in examination processes and in access to
the labour market for higher education graduates. There
are many examples of this. In the Philippines, an elec-
tronic device is used to detect fraud in exams by identify
statistically improbable results (for example when grades
appear to have risen sharply, or when the statistical distri-
bution of the scores is erratic or difficult to interpret).
Other countries, particularly in Europe and North Amer-
ica, recommend using a website to detect plagiarism
(www.turnitin.com). Others recommend adopting auto-
mated procedures to manage all stages of examination.
These procedures are based on the experience of Azer-
baijan, where the higher education admissions process is
run entirely by computer: designing tests, administering
exams, grading tests, processing university admissions
and informing candidates of the results. The University
Grants Commission of India has decided to request that
universities add computer microchips to the degrees they
award to students in order to reduce the circulation of fake
university degrees (Upadhyay, 2004).
LINE 5: FACILITATING PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Reliable and user-friendly information systems are needed
in higher education and accrediting institutions. In partic-
ular, many English-speaking countries have developed
directories of courses or institutions accredited by their
recognized institutions and approved accreditation agen-
cies. A directory of distance education programmes
accredited by the Distance Education and Training Coun-
cil is now available on the Internet at www.detc.org. In the
United States, the state of Oregon has an Office of Degree
Authorization (www.osac.state.or.us) and the state of
Michigan has compiled a list of unapproved accreditation
agencies (www.michigan.gov). Furthermore, the Interna-
tional Association of University Presidents has created a
register of reliable accreditation agencies.
However, in the context of internationalization and the
globalization of higher education, access to international
reference databases on accredited higher education insti-
tutions and courses needs to be facilitated. The Council
for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), a coordinat-
ing body for higher education accreditation, has paved the
way by creating a database with examples of US accredi-
tation obtained by higher education institutions located in
31 different countries. In addition, information on relia-
bility, quality and standards could be made available to
applicants interested in overseas courses. For example, for
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Developing codes of practice and standards of
academic integrity for personnel of higher
education institutions and overseas students:
this strategy has been adopted by Northwest-
ern University (USA), where the registration of
overseas students now requires adherence to
codes of conduct and to the University’s stan-
dards of academic integrity. These codes pro-
hibit the following behaviour: falsification of
any portion of the application for admission or
financial aid; falsification or alteration of any
academic or personal records required for par-
ticipation; and plagiarism, cheating, fabrica-
tion, obtaining an unfair advantage, and so
on. Students can be withdrawn from the pro-
gramme at any time if they violate the codes or
standards or conduct themselves in a way that
brings the programme into ‘disrepute’.
Source: http://www.northwestern.edu/studyabroad/
summerstudy/Code_of_Conduct.pdf 
Box I.7.7 Codes of practice of Northwestern University, USA
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all cross-border higher education, there is a need to widely
publicize (on websites) recruitment fairs, course require-
ments and help lines, as well as rules, regulations, agree-
ments, placement schemes for new students, and so on.
One good example is South Africa, which seeks to main-
tain websites listing accredited overseas universities.
Finally, systems to penalize institutions that provide unre-
liable or false information could be established.
LINE 6: ESTABLISHING AND USING AWARENESS
INDICATORS OR ‘RED FLAGS’
These indicators could help various stakeholders with
different levels of responsibility, including accrediting
institutions, entities in charge of quality assurance, pres-
idents and rectors of universities, department directors,
academics, managers of e-training companies, funding
and sponsoring agencies, students, and users of higher
education graduates. The table included in the Appendix
provides an example of guidelines for checking the
integrity of an accrediting organization or training insti-
tution. Box I.7.8, inspired by the work of Johansson, 
provides a checklist of indicators or ‘red ﬂags’ for iden-
tifying fake universities.
FUTURE TRENDS, LESSONS LEARNED AND
CONCLUSIONS
The persistent growth in the demand for higher education
services (see forecasts in Table I.7.1), coupled with the
variety of agencies involved in the market, will sustain the
pressure for more distorted practices. Fortunately, and as
a direct consequence, a trend towards more transparency,
accountability and ethics is simultaneously on the rise.
This trend demands more regulation, the design of codes
of conduct, training to ﬁght academic fraud, better access
to reliable information, separating examinations from
access to jobs, and so on. At the same time, recent trends
show that the nature of certiﬁcation and accreditation is
changing. Greater emphasis is being placed on the results
and skills obtained by students rather than on the processes
or means involved. In this context, the notion of ‘account-
ability’ of accrediting institutions and quality assurance
systems might change and there may be a signiﬁcant
movement towards more transparency.
Furthermore, complementary action trends are already
addressing the challenge of adapting existing quality
assurance and accreditation mechanisms to the develop-
ment and diversiﬁcation of demand. These trends include
voluntary cooperation among partners within the higher
education profession, the creation of international lists of
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 The institution either claims to be accredited
by an unrecognized organization or plays
down the significance of accreditation.
 The name of the institution is remarkably
similar to that of a genuine university.
 The institution often changes address.
 The name of the institution is invented or
misleading.
 The institution lacks a physical address and
can only be contacted by email or fax.
 Enrolment requirements are minimal.
 The institution emphasizes on its website
that it is not a fake university.
 Information about fees refers to degree
certificates and not tuition fees.
 Degrees are based purely on vocational
experience.
 Degree requirements are minimal and
degrees are awarded within a brief period.
 Illustrations of the degree certificates are
published on the institution’s website.
 The logos of recognized credit card compa-
nies are shown on the institution’s website.
 Degree documents can be pre-dated.
Source: adapted from Johansson (2005), available at:
http://english.hsv.se/?contentId=2181
Box I.7.8 Fake universities often have one or more of the following features:
TABLE I.7.1 
Forecasts of global demand for international higher education for the top five source countries
2000 2005 2010 2020 2025 Growth (%)
China 218,437 437,109 760,103 1,937,129 2,973,287 11.0
South Korea 81,370 96,681 114,269 155,737 172,671 3.1
India 76,908 141,691 271,193 502,237 629,080 8.8
Japan 66,097 65,872 68,544 71,974 73,665 0.4
Greece 60,486 68,285 75,339 84,608 89,903 1.6
Source: Global Student Mobility 2025, available at: http://www.idp.com/
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quality-assured and accredited institutions and pro-
grammes, and the introduction of consultancy services
for potential students and users. According to the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, a cascade of mechanisms and entities
sharing different degrees of responsibility for certiﬁca-
tion are thus expected to progressively develop at differ-
ent levels, as follows: 
 At the institutional level, internal evaluation and audit
systems will develop to complement external audit
mechanisms. This is the case in Slovakia, where the
law has introduced internal university auditing as ‘an
objective activity focused mainly on operative and
independent assessment of the appropriateness and
efficiency of the operation of the entity covered by
the audit.’
 At the national level, quality assurance arrangements
will depend on historical factors: centralized versus
decentralized higher education and the private sector
share. U21 is a good example: quality assurance is not
managed by prestigious universities but by an inde-
pendent institution linked to a proﬁt-making company
called Thomson Learning.
 At the sub-regional level, independent regional,
public or private accreditation agencies (for example
the Central and Eastern European Network of Qual-
ity Assurance Agencies) will evaluate institutions
and providers.
 At the regional level, regional mechanisms for mon-
itoring and recognizing national quality assurance and
accreditation systems will be strengthened. The
Bologna process in Europe, for instance, favours the
creation of bodies such as the European Consortium
for Accreditation (ECA), which aim to make national
quality assurance systems transparent – not to replace
them (see Box I.7.9 on the Netherlands).
 At the international level, international mechanisms
for monitoring and recognizing regional and national
quality assurance and accreditation systems may
improve and enjoy more support by stakeholders.
UNESCO, the World Bank, OECD and other interna-
tional institutions – public and private – will pursue
initiatives in this regard. However, no excessive opti-
mism is warranted here.
Observers say that a comprehensive international
quality assurance system is unlikely to develop in the near
future as a substitute for national policies and procedures
because of inertia, national resistance and the practical
difficulties of imposing coordination and rules of the
game on an uneven galaxy of providers. Put differently,
a comprehensive international higher education market
is unlikely to be established soon. At the same time, some
arguments suggest that, because of globalization, it is
likely that strong pressure will encourage the concentra-
tion of the market of higher education providers. It may
have some of the following features:
 Stable elite higher education sector (both public and
private). 
 A growing share of corporate institutions.
 The deterioration, if not closing down, of some tradi-
tional public higher education institutions.
 The disappearance of many private institutions.
 Great volatility and instability of small institutions. 
This may have important consequences for trans-
parency and accountability issues. Indeed, depending on
the segment of the higher education sector concerned
(that is, small private higher education institutions, which
are not regarded as part of the ‘elite’), opportunities for
corruption may remain high or grow in the future – and so
will the need to address them.
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At the national level:
 Same requirements for public and private
providers.
 Independent judgments and clear sanc-
tions.
 Plurality in methods of quality assessment.
 Accreditation and quality assessment
report made public.
At the European level: 
 Creation of the European Consortium for
Accreditation.
 Mutual recognition of accreditation deci-
sions.
 Introduction of a code of good practice,
which must be sufficiently independent
from government, higher education insti-
tutions, businesses, and so on.
 Public accountability through public and
officially available policies, procedures,
guidelines and criteria.
Source: http://www.qa-in.nl/ 
Box I.7.9 Higher education accreditation in the Netherlands
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How can I determine if an accrediting organization may be 
a ‘mill’?
What questions should I ask to determine whether a degree
provider is a ‘mill’?
If the answers to many of the following questions are ‘yes’, the
accrediting organization under consideration might be a ‘mill’:
 Does the operation allow accredited status to be purchased? 
 Does the operation publish lists of institutions or programmes they
claim to have accredited without those institutions and
programmes knowing that they are listed or have been accredited? 
 Does the operation claim that it is recognized (by, for example,
USDE or CHEA) when it is not? 
 Are few if any standards for quality published by the operation? 
 Is a very short period of time required to achieve accredited status? 
 Are accreditation reviews routinely confined to submitting
documents and do not include site visits or interviews of key
personnel by the accrediting organization? 
 Is ‘permanent’ accreditation granted without any requirement for
subsequent periodic review, either by an external body or by the
organization itself? 
 Does the operation use organizational names similar to recognized
accrediting organizations? 
 Does the operation make claims in its publications for which there
is no evidence? 
If the answers to many of the following questions are ‘yes’, the
degree provider under consideration may be a ‘mill’:
 Can degrees be purchased? 
 Is there a claim of accreditation when there is no evidence of 
this status? 
 Is there a claim of accreditation from a questionable accrediting
organization? 
 Does the operation lack state or federal licensure or authority to
operate? 
 Is little if any attendance required of students, either online or 
in class? 
 Are few assignments required for students to earn credits? 
 Is a very short period of time required to earn a degree? 
 Are degrees available based solely on experience or resumé review? 
 Are there few requirements for graduation? 
 Does the operation fail to provide any information about a campus
or business location or address and provides only a post office box? 
 Does the operation fail to provide a list of its faculty and their
qualifications? 
 Does the operation have a name similar to other well-known
colleges and universities? 
 Does the operation make claims in its publications for which there
is no evidence? 
Source: Council for Higher Education Accreditation, 2005 (available at: http://www.chea.org/degreemills/default.htm)
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the fall of the USSR, the five inde-
pendent republics of Central Asia (Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan) have undergone pro-
found socioeconomic and political
changes that have had particularly serious
repercussions on the education sector. 
The difficulties involved in preserving
the high literacy and education levels
inherited from the Soviet period soon
became apparent. The disorganized
decentralization of education structures,
budgetary constraints and decreased
state involvement that followed the col-
lapse of the USSR created unforeseen
obstacles for the authorities of the new
republics. Local authorities were suddenly
confronted with the difficult task of run-
ning educational institutions locally, with-
out receiving the required level of local
financial autonomy and investment.
As the centrally planned economies of
the region continue their transformation
into dynamic market economies, public
education systems are still suffering the
negative consequences of the transition
process. They fail to adapt to a new eco-
nomic context that demands new skills,
the introduction of new education mod-
els and an effective overall reform of the
education system. 
The resulting deterioration in the over-
all quality of education and the difficul-
ties that higher education systems in the
region are currently confronted with are
primarily the result of five key factors: cor-
ruption; low salaries; an insufficient sup-
ply of appropriately trained staff; limited
material and equipment; and inadequate
infrastructure and teaching facilities. As
a result of these factors, the overall qual-
ity of the education systems in the region
is deeply compromised. 
UNDERSTANDING THE WIDER
CONTEXT
The collapse of the USSR and the severe
socioeconomic crisis that followed
brought about serious economic prob-
lems and increased the incidence of
poverty across Central Asia (which
includes some of the poorest republics of
the former Soviet Union). These changes
opened new possibilities for the well-
connected, and increased the opportuni-
ties for those willing to engage in corrupt
practices. The introduction of market cap-
italism also brought about the liberaliza-
tion and subsequent privatization of the
academic sector. However, it failed to put
in place effective regulatory bodies and an
adequate accreditation system, thereby
facilitating the spread of corruption. 
Although the existence of academic
corruption during the Soviet period is
well documented, the centrally controlled
education system ensured that corrup-
tion remained restricted to each of the
defined structural levels.1 Since indep-
endence, such practices have spread
across the board, creating a general
sociopolitical context marked by wide-
spread corruption in all spheres and social
levels. The pervasiveness of corruption in
higher education is of particular concern.
At present, corruption in education is
one of the main problems taking a heavy
toll on the societies of these transition
countries, since education constitutes a
key pillar on which to lay the foundations
of the future development of the region. 
Thus, academic corruption in Central
Asia must be understood within a wider
social context that is marked by pervasive
corruption at all levels; from the adminis-
tration, judiciary, police forces and local
authorities to key public services (includ-
ing health and education). The existence
of widespread endemic corruption at all
social levels has created a situation in
which buying positions, exam grades or
access to university are not only con-
ceived as possibilities but are regarded as
socially accepted practices in countries
where bribery is accepted as part of
everyday life. There are so many irregu-
larities that certain corrupt practices are
overlooked and not regarded as corrup-




The endemic corruption that exists in all
spheres of society has permeated the
education systems of Central Asia in sev-
eral ways. Although corrupt practices
begin at elementary school, evidence
suggests that the worst corruption is at
university level (Moore, 2004). Corrup-
tion in higher education involves the sale
or provision of places, grades, degrees,
academic credentials, and a long and so
on. (covering a wide range of areas
within the academic sector) by those in
positions of power. (Academic corrup-
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